HELEN CLARK
1950 -
The Labour party lurched in all directions for
twenty-two years after the death of Norman Kirk in 1974. It stuttered under
Rowling, swung right under Lange and Douglas, stagnated under Palmer and
continued leaning to the right under Moore.
Then came Helen Clark.
Clark was a true socialist and her concern for
the underprivileged was sincere and rock-solid. Sometimes appearing to conceal
this caring nature was a steely determination to succeed politically. While no
doubt her ambition as party leader was to usher Labour into a new era comparable
to that of the first Labour government, she also had ambitions of her own.
Primary among them was to become the country’s first female prime minister and
no secret was made of it. Among her early tactics was lobbying for the election
of a female Labour party president who could be relied on to make candidate
selections that would ensure the party moved forward on social issues including,
especially, gender equality.
She was denied the legacy of first female
prime minister by her predecessor who, while also ambitious, achieved the honour
indirectly. This left Helen Clark with the chance to become the first woman
elected prime minister in her own right with the endorsement of the entire
populace. She grasped the opportunity and served a creditable term of nine
years. Apart from an anxious moment in 1996 before becoming prime minister her
hold on the Labour party leadership was never threatened.
And. as already noted, Labour was a party that
had, to put it charitably, endured a mixed history since the sudden death of
Norman Kirk. He had given the party authority, stability and unity which it
failed to regain until Helen Clark finally asserted herself in 1996.
Clark was first elected to parliament in 1981
and was an uncomfortable caucus member when the Roger Douglas reforms swept over
the party (and the country) from 1984. She also found National prime minister
Robert Muldoon extremely intimidating. She did not support David Lange when he
successfully contested the Labour leadership in 1983, voting instead for the
incumbent and more traditional Bill Rowling. As the battered party attempted to
pull itself back together following its eventful 1984-90 term in government she
wisely deferred her bid for the leadership – seeking and winning it only after
Michael Moore had suffered his second election loss in 1993. She herself was
denied a win in 1996 (a controversial call by a minor party leader didn’t help)
but won decisively in 1999 to achieve her objective and become prime minister.
Helen Clark was born on 26 February, 1950 into
a family which farmed sheep and beef west of Hamilton. The eldest of four girls,
she was not particularly close to either parent although never neglected. Her
father was a staunch National party traditionalist; her mother preoccupied with
women’s groups and amateur dramatics, remaining a somewhat distant figure to her
daughters. Helen soon proved to be academically rather than agriculturally
inclined. After eight years boarding at Epsom girls’ grammar she enrolled at
Auckland university, taking history and specialising in political studies. She
was an avid reader thirsting for knowledge. Her family were strict Presbyterians
but she pushed that aside and developed her own independence, finding political
causes such as opposition to the Vietnam war and the proposed Springbok tour of
NZ in 1973. Her natural home was the Labour party despite her family connection
with National. She began taking an interest in party organisation and assisted
with Michael Bassett’s campaign for the Te Atatu seat in 1972, the year Labour
swept to power.
She herself stood unsuccessfully in 1975, in
her home electorate of blue-ribbon Piako. Her chief interest up to that point
had been party organisation in which she was by now fully immersed. She had met
Jim Anderton in 1971, bonded with him and supported him in his bids for Auckland
council and mayoralty in 1974 and 1977 respectively. Her understanding of Labour
party organisation quickly became, in the words of Michael Bassett “as detailed
as Norman Kirk’s and not far short of Peter Fraser’s.”
Clark’s relationship with Jim Anderton is
significant and moved through three distinct phases. They began as enthusiastic
party organisers; fell out over policy differences when both were MPs in 1985,
and reconciled in 1999 when they formed a coalition government with Clark as
prime minister and Anderton as her deputy.
She met him, as noted, in 1971 and at that
stage both shared an interest in party organisation rather more than any
ambitions to become MPs. They recognised the power the national executive,
especially the chair, wielded over such matters as candidate selection. But
their initial drive was to rejuvenate the membership. This eventually earned
them a place on the national executive in 1978 where together they shared a
belief that they were now part of the power centre and that elected members
should follow the executive’s instructions and policies. It was an attitude not
appreciated by MPs, especially when recalcitrant members were threatened with
de-selection. They over-stepped in this of course and were pulled back into
line.
But success lay ahead for both. Anderton
became party president in 1979 and was elected to parliament on the David Lange
landslide in 1984. Helen Clark had won the nomination for the safe Labour seat
of Mount Albert three years earlier and entered parliament under opposition
leader Bill Rowling in 1981. Here she came face to face with prime minister
Robert Muldoon whose condescending attitude towards women unnerved her.
She soon gained confidence. Aged only 31 and
one of very few women MPs she began attracting the interest of the media. Early
assessments were that she lacked charisma but possessed a sharp mind and was
definitely someone to watch. As her name entered the public domain her personal
attributes became as familiar as her political prowess: an avid reader,
classical music and opera lover and a keen outdoors person with interests
extending to tramping, cross-country skiing and mountaineering. As an MP she was
hard-working and a convincing debater capable of presenting carefully
thought-out arguments.
But she felt isolated in her early years. Her
close association with Jim Anderton counted against her. The caucus had been
preoccupied with leadership issues since the end of 1980 when Bill Rowling
narrowly saw off a challenge from David Lange. Lobbying for a change continued
into Clark’s first term and she was known to stand right behind party president
Anderton in his strong support for Bill Rowling. More and more in the caucus
were now favouring Lange.
After the inevitable leadership change
occurred in early 1983 Clark was still seen as a less than loyal caucus member.
She was passed over for a junior cabinet position after Labour’s resounding 1984
victory, despite being clearly capable of one. Above and beyond her duties as an
electorate MP and member of a governing caucus she remained on the party’s
executive and, disappointed over missing a cabinet role but undeterred, busied
herself in organisational matters, particularly regarding candidate selection.
Clark was largely responsible for the election of Margaret Wilson as party
president, who shared her views on the need for more women members. Two more
women (Ruth Dyson and Maryann Street) succeeded Wilson as president and the
gender-equality momentum continued. The seeds for Clark’s elevation to party
leader and eventually prime minister were planted in this way in the
mid-eighties.
But the mid-eighties also saw the launch of
Roger Douglas’s dramatic financial reforms which appeared to go against
everything Labour, and especially Helen Clark, stood for. It placed her in an
unenviable position as she had detested the Muldoon interventions but felt the
reforms were happening too quickly and went too far. Jim Anderton, elected to
parliament’s Sydenham seat in 1984, felt this even more strongly. How vigorously
to oppose the reforms within the caucus became the issue over which Clark and
Anderton parted company. Clark the pragmatist saw merit in persevering with the
reforms in anticipation of eventual social benefits; Anderton the idealist could
only see the violation of Labour’s true values, especially the preservation of
jobs. The relationship between the two cooled and remained so for more than a
decade. Anderton left Labour and formed his “New Labour” party in 1989.
The split benefitted Helen Clark politically
as she was now seen less of an outsider. When Labour was re-elected for a second
term in 1987 she finally entered cabinet. With her talent and ability now
recognised she set about performing to the best of her ability in her two
portfolios: housing and conservation. She was suited to both. She micro-managed
them and won respect from prime minister David Lange who began leaning on her
increasingly after he had fallen out with Roger Douglas. In her housing
portfolio she had the chance to dig her toes in over one of Douglas’s more
extreme asset sales policies. He urged her to consider selling off state houses
as part of his infamous December, 1987 package. State provision of housing was
something Clark passionately believed in and, although a brand new minister, she
rather scornfully rejected Douglas’s suggestion.
In 1989 Lange appointed Clark to the much more
senior portfolio of health. He was by then predicting she would one day be New
Zealand’s first woman prime minister.
Minister of health is always a difficult role
but Clark asserted herself strongly. On at least two occasions she replaced
overspending hospital boards with commissioners. She showed her feminist colours
by raising the status of midwives to that of obstetrically-trained doctors – a
bad decision as it turned out with obstetric care standards dropping. But the
party leadership’s faith in her endured. With the changing of the guard from
David Lange to Geoffrey Palmer she was moved from conservation to labour while
still retaining health. She was now a senior and influential member of the
government. When a ballot took place in the caucus for a new deputy prime
minister under Palmer she was elected by a comfortable margin. Michael Bassett
theorised that it was the new MPs handpicked by Margaret Wilson that gave Clark
the vital edge. Nonetheless she was now just one step away from the prime
minister’s office.
But a difficult step. As noted in earlier
articles the party had been in total disarray since the solidarity between David
Lange and Roger Douglas disintegrated. Palmer’s valiant efforts to restore unity
had failed and there was no chance that Labour would be re-elected for a third
term in 1990. Bidding for the leadership lay ahead but a far more immediate
concern for Clark was retaining her own seat given the party’s dismal showing in
the polls. Others in caucus had the same concern and collectively decided that
if the aloof academic Palmer was replaced by someone more worldly their seats
may well be safer. Clark shared that view and Mike Moore became PM in September,
1990 – just two months prior to the election. Clark remained deputy.
Labour was defeated heavily but Helen Clark
won her seat by a margin of 1,230 - down substantially from her 1987 majority of
5,376 and 6,207 in 1984. But it would surge again to 4,656 in 1993 proving she
was respected by her constituents and her momentary slip was caused by the
nationwide swing against Labour.
Since 1989 Clark had had the benefit of an
extremely sage support person in university economist Heather Simpson. Simpson
functioned as her “gatekeeper” and they were a close-knit team when planning
strategy. Now that the election was over and Clark had won her seat the key
consideration was how, and more importantly, when, she should make a bid for the
leadership. And ultimately, win an election as leader.
Timing was key. It was thought by Helen and
Heather (H1 and H2 as they became known) that Mike Moore’s popularity would wane
after his heavy election loss and that the best time to make a bid would be
following the 1993 election, likely to again be lost considering the size of the
National win in 1990. But National appeared to be trying hard to self-destruct
in its first term. It savagely cut welfare benefits, failed to deliver on a
promise to remove the superannuation surtax; continued to privatise and sell off
government assets and passed legislation which resulted in a huge reduction in
union strength and membership. This played into Labour’s hands and when National
failed to win a working majority on election night in 1993 the media went into a
frenzy. National was saved by one electorate changing hands after special votes
and a speaker appointed from the opposition. If the more cerebral and
authoritative Clark had led Labour into that election they may have won.
But they remained in opposition and Clark’s
plan proceeded. It was now that the careful candidate selection dating back to
1987 bore fruit and the numbers supporting Clark as leader steadily grew. She
had publicly shown loyalty to Mike Moore throughout National’s first term but
all along had planned to make a move immediately after the 1993 election if the
party lost. In the event it was David Lange who proposed a ballot on Mike
Moore’s leadership. The seconder of the proposal was, surprisingly, Mike Moore
himself.
It wasn’t just a ballot between Clark and
Moore; it was also a contest between the respective supporters of traditional
Labour and Rogernomics. Clark won by 26 votes to 19. “Rogernome” David Caygill
narrowly beat Michael Cullen for the deputy leadership. Helen Clark now had the
formidable task of leading a divided opposition against a united (albeit
slightly battered) government through to the next election. And the next
election was to be conducted under the unfamiliar Mixed Member Proportional
system. It was a major challenge.
It has been noted that the split with Jim
Anderton in 1985 had benefitted Clark politically. Indeed it had as she then
became acceptable to the leadership for a cabinet role. But things change.
Anderton left Labour altogether in 1989 and in 1991 his New Labour party had
joined forces with several other left-leaning parties to form the Alliance. It
was a serious party - by no means a fringe element. By the early months of 1994
it was threatening Labour’s position as the main opposition. Traditional Labour
voters feeling neglected by the 1984-90 reforms were flocking to it. And the
Alliance did not see itself as a potential coalition partner to Labour – it saw
Labour as its rival as both competed for the left wing and traditional Labour
vote. The Labour caucus was spooked. Even if it retained its position as the
main opposition a split vote on the left between Labour and Alliance would
assure a National win.
To add to Labour and Clark’s woes the Labour
caucus itself remained divided. Those who had supported Moore in the 1993 ballot
were not lying down. Things were not looking good for Helen Clark as she
struggled through her first two years as leader. Her personal rating dropped as
low as 3% and at one stage Labour’s support dropped to 14%. There had been
several by-elections during the period and in more than one the Alliance had
beaten Labour into second place behind National. Clark was looking dispirited.
And National was looking confident, having
survived the close 1993 election. Treaty of Waitangi issues kept them at the
forefront in the media and they had made good on their promise to review the
electoral system. The economy was looking good. The Labour caucus felt it was
staring defeat in the face again in 1996. It did what parties, especially
Labour, did in such situations: it thought seriously about yet another
leadership change. Things came to a head on 28 May, 1996 when a delegation of
front bench Labour MPs strode into Helen Clark’s office without an appointment
and without warning – stating bluntly that they believed Labour would lose the
election if she remained leader. The delegation included Michael Cullen and Koro
Wetere who Clark had thought were, if not loyal supporters, could at least be
relied on not to turn against her. The others were Phil Goff, Annette King and
Bill Sutton, previous supporters of Mike Moore. The delegation as a whole asked
her to stand down in favour of Phil Goff although it was likely Mike Moore also
had his eye on a second crack at the leadership.
It was a pivotal moment in Clark’s career. She
handled it superbly, telling the somewhat nervous delegation that she had no
intention of standing down and giving solid arguments for avoiding a leadership
ballot. It was Tuesday - a caucus meeting was scheduled and Clark invited them
to conduct a ballot at that meeting if they still wished. No ballot was held.
Clark had survived the only threat ever made to her leadership.
As the election drew nearer Clark’s increased
confidence and declared intention to lead the party back to its roots was warmly
received by Labour supporters nationwide and the party’s popularity began to
rise. But nowhere near enough. It received only 28% of the vote in the 1996
election (its worst result since 1928) but due to the vagaries of the newly
introduced MMP electoral system (explained in the article on Jim Bolger) it was
still in with a chance as the Alliance (with 10%) was never going to support a
National-led government. In fact, as the numbers detailed in the Bolger article
show, Helen Clark would have led the government as prime minister had Winston
Peters’ NZ First party chosen to support Labour.
Nonetheless National won a third term in 1996
and Labour spent three more years in opposition. Clark soon won back the support
of the front-benchers who had threatened her leadership but now turned to the
more difficult reconciliation with Jim Anderton. Firm friends with identical
political colours from 1971 to 1985 when they parted company over the
Douglas/Lange financial reforms, they both now realised that things had changed
in the MMP environment. To have any influence from here on they needed each
other.
In 1997 the Greens separated from the Alliance
but it was the Alliance that Labour needed to cosy up to if it wanted any chance
of winning in 1999. Dealing initially with Alliance deputy leader Sandra Lee,
Clark made the first moves towards restoring her relationship with Anderton by
accepting an invitation to address the Alliance conference in August, 1998.
Equally prepared to compromise, Anderton now showed signs of accepting the
political reality that taxing and spending heavily no longer won votes. His move
from idealism to pragmatism emulated Clark’s back in 1985. From here on they
were again inseparable. In 2002 Anderton’s pragmatism would take him away from
the Alliance which, retaining its optimistic idealism, eventually withered away.
The Greens in contrast went on to establish their own much more durable
identity.
But the Alliance, led by Anderton, was alive
and well as the 1999 election loomed. Labour’s polling was helped by National’s
internal issues which led to a leadership change in 1997 (Bolger to Shipley)
followed a year later by the collapse of their coalition arrangement with New
Zealand First. It was looking like Labour’s election to lose.
It was a confident Labour leader who
campaigned in 1999 with now unwavering support from Jim Anderton’s Alliance
party. The results were as predicted. Labour won 49 seats, the Alliance won ten
and the Greens seven. A Labour/Alliance coalition government was formed with the
Greens support assured. This left NZ First on the cross benches with five seats
and National with 39, supported in opposition by ACT with nine and United with
one, both relative newcomers.
It had taken eighteen years but Helen Clark
had achieved her long-cherished objective. She was now prime minister. Jim
Anderton was her deputy and in cabinet along with three other Alliance members.
While Helen Clark had shone as a minister in the 1987 Labour government, her
nine-year journey from there to the prime minister’s office had been gruelling.
And plenty more challenges lay ahead.
But the term started well and at a fast clip.
Taxes were raised for high income earners and there were increases in other
levies such as tobacco and fringe-benefit tax. Interest on student loans was
frozen and the minimum wage was raised. Jenny Shipley’s short-lived attempt to
open ACC cover to private providers was quickly closed off. The national
superannuation fund was topped up annually to provide for its inevitable
increase in demand. This was Labour as we know it - restoring the political
landscape to resemble those of earlier times. The employment contracts act was
repealed in favour of the softer employment relations act but, interestingly,
almost nothing was done to reverse the controversial financial reforms
introduced by the 1984-90 Labour government and continued by National. The
economy was performing well, led by the export sector and tourism. This was
partly attributable to the outgoing National government.
There was a honeymoon period and the
government’s popularity soared to 50% in March, 2000 after languishing as low as
14% in 1995 - two years into Clark’s leadership. But the commercial sector was
worried by the raft of changes Labour had brought in, especially the repeal of
the employment contracts act which had heavily favoured employers. They saw
increasing government involvement and welfare support in a range of sectors they
felt government should keep out of. The term “nanny state” was bandied about.
When business confidence dropped to a low level in the middle months of 2000 the
honeymoon ended. It was the “winter of discontent”.
Regarding the status of Jim Anderton and his
Alliance party in the government, he knew his place. He controlled only 10 votes
out of forty-nine. Nonetheless he had a coalition agreement which enabled him to
set up a ministry of economic development (which became permanent) and, in
February 2001, to finally obtain cabinet approval for a fully New Zealand owned
trading bank, KiwiBank. It turned into a major success story and a personal
triumph for Anderton who had long campaigned for it.
Helen Clark ran the cabinet and caucus with a
strong hand. She kept abreast of all her ministers’ activities to a degree that
probably matched Kirk and Fraser. Her control over all aspects of government was
total and nobody ever considered challenging her. She dealt with any
recalcitrant caucus or cabinet members firmly and was not timid in placing
sympathetic candidates into key government or judicial positions. She was also a
respected figure internationally in a world thrown into turmoil by the events of
11 September, 2001. She had read widely on international affairs and decisively
refused to associate New Zealand with the ill-conceived invasion of Iraq in
2003. She had, however, no hesitation to commit SAS troops to Afghanistan in a
largely peace-keeping role. A full review of New Zealand’s military hardware
resulted in the sale of the country’s ageing Skyhawks. Helen Clark had been a
firm supporter of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy which was left unchanged but
relations with the United States had by now improved considerably.
As a further example of Labour and Clark’s
social conscience, the government agreed to accept 75 refugees who had been
rescued from the sea by a Dutch vessel “Tampa” in 2001. Australia had refused to
take any and the decision was controversial but Clark had no regrets over it.
By 2001 Labour had recovered from its winter
of discontent and its polling had risen sharply. This was partly at the expense
of its coalition partner which was steadily dropping. It was a worry for Jim
Anderton. He himself was secure. His seat seemed to be safe whether he
represented Labour, New Labour or the Alliance and he was now on the best of
terms with Helen Clark. His worries concerned his relationship with his own
party. While he had realised that lofty idealism didn’t get you into government
his fellow caucus members were yet to learn that lesson. There were differences
of opinion over the Alliance’s desire to extravagantly increase government
spending but the really divisive issue was the contribution of NZ troops to the
war in Afghanistan. The party appeared to be disintegrating over that issue
alone.
Which in fact it did. In a bizarre move the
party voted to expel Jim Anderton in 2002, considering him to have abandoned
their core left-wing values by supporting Labour over Afghanistan and their more
centrist policies in general. Expelling Anderton was the Alliance’s death
warrant. He had declared his intention to leave the party at the 2002 election
anyway.
With her coalition partner in disarray Helen
Clark called an early election for July, 2002. Her campaign started well but was
derailed by the publication of a book by left-wing activist Nicky Hager. It was
published the same month as the election and documented the accidental, but
illegal, release of genetically modified corn plants in November, 2000. It
accused the government of a cover-up and drew attention to bio-security issues,
the transparency of government and the genetic modification controversy in
general, right in the middle of an election campaign. Helen Clark was totally
wrong-footed and felt bound to interrupt her scheduled campaign programme to
front up for a live current affairs interview. She floundered her way through it
as she had neither read the book nor been briefed by officials. Rightly or
wrongly she associated the leaking of the corn plant story (Corngate as it was
dubbed) with the Green movement, further alienating it from Labour.
It was costly for Labour and probably the
reason why they failed to win enough votes to govern alone. They were fortunate
in that many voters who deserted them went to the centrist party United (formed
in 1995) rather than National.
The Alliance failed to win any electorate
seats and their party vote faded to a mere 1.27% – well below the 5% threshold
needed to get any members into parliament (it had been 7.74% in 1999). Although
the party continued to exist nominally well into the next decade with a
succession of different leaders and presidents, they were a spent force and were
never represented in parliament again. Meanwhile Jim Anderton’s personal
popularity in his seat of Sydenham ensured he was re-elected in 2002, now
representing his new Progressive party which polled at 1.7% - high enough to
bring another list member into parliament on the back of his electorate win. It
was two more votes to add to Labour’s 52 seats but not enough for an absolute
majority.
The majority was eventually provided by the
United party (now United Future). It was fortunate indeed that ex-Labour member
Peter Dunne’s centrist family-focused party assured Labour of support. Labour
had publicly declared NZ First was a definite non-starter as a partner in
government remembering the chaos they had caused with National. And even the
much more compatible Greens were not an option as, long before Corngate, they
had refused to join Labour unless they extended an existing moratorium on the
cultivation of genetically engineered plants. Labour refused to do this.
National’s campaign under new leader Bill
English was a disaster (21%) and could not form a government even with support
from ACT, United Future and NZ First.
So Labour settled into its second term. It was
again a minority government propped up by support parties (United Future and
Progressive) but Helen Clark was proving to be the master of MMP politics. The
lesson learned from the 1996-98 National/NZ First coalition was not to make the
agreement too specific or too detailed. The 1996 agreement ran to many pages
while Clark’s was much briefer in both 1999 and 2002, leaving room to manoeuvre.
In fact in all respects Clark had become an extremely astute politician,
communicating well with the public and reacting to their needs. She travelled
the country frequently, conducted multiple media interviews and headed a
smoothly running administration suffering only the occasional mini-crisis. Colin
James considered it the best-controlled government he had observed in 35 years.
She did not radiate old-world friendliness in the way Coates, Savage and Lange
(first term only) had but what she did radiate was authority. In the main it was
gentle but firm. Her strong support for the arts and culture showed a softer
side and she served as minister of arts, culture and heritage throughout her
term as prime minister.
Clark’s deputy in the 2002-2005 term was
Michael Cullen, replacing Jim Anderton whose ranking had moved down to third. A
relationship of immense trust had built up between Clark and Cullen. Both had
entered parliament in 1981 and cabinet in 1987. Cullen too was a master
politician extraordinarily well-versed in his finance portfolio and a useful
fix-it man in other areas. Clark too was now well in control of financial
matters, a somewhat weak spot earlier. The rest of the cabinet was short on
experience although foreign affairs and justice minister Phil Goff and health
minister Annette King (both now fully on board with Helen Clark having forgotten
the events of May, 1996), were among the leading lights. Jim Anderton retained
economic development along with other smaller portfolios.
Everything was running relatively smoothly but
the government hit the judder-bars in June 2003 when a court ruling declared
Maori claims to ownership of the foreshore and seabed could be heard by the
Maori Land Court after a lower court had earlier ruled that they could not.
Seeing this as a threat to New Zealanders’ right of access to beaches the
government felt obliged to act. Helen Clark was no racist. She had expressed her
opposition to apartheid by protesting over South African rugby tours in 1973 and
1981 and by now could claim to be well-informed on racial matters in general.
What she did lack was a deep knowledge of Maori culture. Her senior colleagues,
Michael Cullen in particular, were equally lacking in this regard and the matter
which could have been left to play out without interference was dealt with in a
manner that can only be described as an over-reaction. In short, the government
planned legislation preventing the Maori Land Court from considering claims
relating to the foreshore.
A nationwide reaction erupted. Although the
legislation was softened by the inclusion of a clause requiring Maori to be
consulted over any major development of the foreshore, Maori from one end of the
country to the other saw the move as a denial of their rights. A protest march
through the North Island picked up supporters and was estimated to contain
15,000 when it stood outside parliament on 5 May, 2004. But it was protesters
within her own party that concerned Helen Clark the most. To satisfy the Maori
members of her caucus she would need to make the legislation more accommodating
to Maori but doing that could cost United Future support. Eventually by
compromising on the wording of foreshore ownership (Crown ownership prevailed
over Public ownership), the bill passed by 65 votes to 55 – with Labour
supported by the Progressives and NZ First. There were dissenters within Labour.
Nanaia Mahuta voted against and Tariana Turia left the Labour party altogether
in protest – setting up a new party, the Maori Party. She was strongly supported
by the protest marchers. Others, including academics, joined the new party and
predicted Labour voters would flock to it at the next election.
The legislation eventually passed its second
and third reading and the sky didn’t fall in. It was repealed by a later
National government (2011) and replaced by a law which allowed Maori redress to
the courts but set a high bar for the establishment of any ownership rights.
This too was controversial but the Maori party felt it had achieved its
objective – having the original act repealed.
The whole saga was damaging to Labour and it
dropped in the polls. But even more damage was inflicted by a single speech made
by one man on 27 January, 2004 – while the foreshore and seabed debate was at
its height. National had narrowly voted to replace leader Bill English with the
more polarising figure of Don Brash in October, 2003. Addressing the Orewa
Rotary Club Brash presented a very simple message: treat all New Zealanders
equally and stop giving special favours to Maori. It struck a nerve. National
rocketed up in the polls and overtook Labour. It was a populist message and left
Labour in a quandary. They needed to counter it, but how – without shifting
sharply into National’s space?
“It was horrible,” Helen Clark remembered
years later. Moving once again into damage control the party checked through its
various social development programmes noting any that could be deemed
“race-based” and rewording them as “needs-based”. The party was helped by
various commentators who claimed Brash’s speech was an attempt to play the race
card for political gain.
Brash made another speech at the same venue a
year later, this time attacking social welfare dependency. The speech failed to
gain the same traction and Labour gradually restored itself to a dominating
position as the 2005 election approached.
Up to the time of the foreshore debate and
reaction to the first Brash speech Labour had been floating proposals such as
“catching the knowledge wave” and “growth through innovation” – rather vague
terms but indications that the party was attempting to move with the times. But
the dramatic race-based events sent it scurrying back to its more familiar
territory. The 2004 budget introduced “Working for Families” – targeted
assistance for low income families which was welcomed in most quarters except by
beneficiaries who felt they should have had a share of the $3 billion made
available for the scheme. Added to this was a promise to spend $3.8 billion
extra on health services over the next three years. It was vintage Labour -
spend big to get out of trouble. The tactic was inflationary and interest rates
rose nine times over the next year. Bigger spending had reached into other
areas. The size of the public service had risen by 7,500 between 1999 and 2005,
nurses and teachers were given generous pay rises and infrastructure spending
increased. The splurge continued in the 2005 budget with interest-free loans
offered to students, rates rebates extended and, the most generous (and in due
course the most successful) innovation was the introduction of KiwiSaver – a
savings scheme offering a $1,000 initial grant from the government and provision
for compulsory top-ups from employers to any worker who joined the scheme.
While Labour had retained the key aspects of
the 1980’s reforms, there had been some asset buy-backs and the replacement of
the employment contracts act with a less severe employment relations act. Some
controls in finance and electricity were also re-established. Things were
looking healthy on the employment front in general, with unemployment down to a
record 3.6%. Labour had also been showing its colours in a number of
controversial social issues. It legalised prostitution in 2003 and introduced a
bill allowing civil unions between same-sex couples in 2004. By the time of the
2005 election the differences between the two major parties had became stark and
much depended on the performance of the party leaders during the campaign.
Unlike 2002 when “Corngate” sabotaged Clark’s
campaign, this time it was Don Brash who was sent scrambling for the damage
control button. The problem arose from an unexpected source – the Exclusive
Brethren. The fundamentalist religious group anonymously distributed a
nationwide brochure attacking the Green party and also Labour, pleading that a
left-wing grouping would destroy business and urging voters to support National.
The problem for Brash was that he constantly denied knowledge of the brochure
and denied he had been in contact with the Brethren when in fact he had been. He
would eventually admit it the following year by which time a book had been
published (Hager again) revealing private emails and examples of secret
fundraising channels for the 2005 campaign including a $1.2 million contribution
from the Brethren.
But that lay in the future. As the campaign
neared its climax Brash was fired up and ready to face Clark in the series of
debates. He was a former governor of the Reserve Bank, a background which lent
authority to his financial arguments. He came close to matching Clark in the
debates and the election was the closest of the three won by Helen Clark. Many
claimed the Exclusive Brethren had cost National the election. Labour won 50
seats, National 48 – an increase of 21. Labour was able to form a minority
coalition government with Jim Anderton, Progressive’s only representative.
Support was promised from NZ First (7 seats) and United Future (3 seats) in
return for ministerial posts and several policy concessions. The Greens (6
seats) promised not to oppose the government (“Corngate” not withstanding). The
Maori party won four of the Maori electorate seats giving them one more seat
than their proportional vote (2.12%) entitled them to thus creating a one seat
overhang in the parliament. Clearly they were not going to support Labour given
the circumstances under which the party was formed. ACT’s two seats brought the
total to 121.
Although the left of centre block held 67
seats including NZ First. Labour’s position was fragile. NZ First held the key
just as they had in 1996 and although they had promised to support the party
winning the most seats negotiations between NZ First leader Winston Peters and
National leader Don Brash had occurred nonetheless. Conditions imposed by Peters
for his support to Labour included the issue of a “Gold Card” to all
superannuitants entitling them to free public transport and other benefits. It
became Winston Peters’ best known legacy.
Brash eventually conceded defeat after special
votes were counted. Helen Clark’s government now entered its third term.
It was her most difficult of the three. The
government’s survival depended on at least two of the three support parties
remaining loyal. Winston Peters and Peter Dunne had been permitted under the
agreement to express their views on any subject outside their portfolio areas
even if they opposed that of the government. Jim Anderton’s support was
rock-solid. Although Clark had proved she could keep coalition governments
together (1999-2005) she remained aware that the National/NZ First coalition had
caused problems for Jim Bolger and had collapsed altogether under Jenny Shipley.
She had also seen her own partner (Alliance) fall apart in 2002. It was
dangerous territory and made even more treacherous by the vastly increased size
of the main opposition. National had won more electorate seats than Labour and
twenty-four new National MPs entered the house in 2005. The intake included
promising talent such as Chris Finlayson, Jonathan Coleman and Paula Bennett as
well as former diplomat Tim Groser. In contrast, Clark’s cabinet, although very
large with 29 members, was relatively weak. The careful candidate selection
process which Clark and Margaret Wilson (now speaker) had set up in the 1980s
had fallen into disuse and few new promising candidates for cabinet posts were
available. Furthermore she had had to fire two ministers (David Benson-Pope and
Taito Philip Field) for alleged misdemeanours. It was an unstable situation on
all fronts. Another pitfall during Clark’s final term was the revelation that
her organisation had spent $885,000 on the 2005 campaign using what proved to be
public funds. MPs and the party organisers had to dip into their pockets and
repay the money. Not a good look for a party with six years experience in
government. It responded by controversially amending the electoral finance laws
in 2007.
On the brighter side were a number of
opportunities for Helen Clark to show a different aspect of her leadership. She
travelled to Scott Base for its 50th anniversary in 2007 accompanied
by Sir Edmund Hillary. She joined rugby supporters at the World Cup in Paris and
in October, 2007 visited Passchendaele to commemorate the 90th
anniversary of the WWI battle. Less rosy was the drop in productivity, the
continued increase in government spending and, controversially, in 2008 the
splitting of Telecom into three separate units: network access, wholesale and
retail. This enabled other telecommunications providers access to the nationwide
network, previously monopolised by Telecom. While it introduced much needed
competition it instantly wiped one-third off the value of Telecom shares, many
of which were held by small shareholders as a retirement nest-egg.
Two further swansongs marked the Labour
government’s final months in office. The first was an emissions trading scheme,
enacted as a response to climate change. The National government retained it
despite earlier criticism but amended it twice (2009, 2011) to make it more
palatable to business interests. The other was the signing of a free trade
agreement with China, negotiations for which had commenced in 2004.
As the term drew to a close Helen Clark
prepared for a battle against yet another National party leader, the fourth
since Jim Bolger. John Key had been in parliament only since 2002 but had been
recruited as a potential leader. His background was in international banking and
he had scored points repeatedly against Michael Cullen, himself no push-over on
financial matters, in the finance debates during the 2005 campaign.
2008 was not a good time for Helen Clark to be
facing an international finance expert in an election campaign. The so-called
Global Financial Crisis had been building for over a year and reliable hands
were needed to guide New Zealand through as it deepened. Clark had already taken
steps to prevent melt-downs by New Zealand financial institution from leaving
their customers penniless by introducing the Crown Retail Deposit Guarantee
Scheme. It turned out to be costly. One failure alone (the bail-out of South
Canterbury Finance) cost the next government $1.58 billion. But Clark had no
regrets – she saw it as the cost of maintaining financial stability.
A further hiccup in the election build-up was
provided by the reliably unpredictable Winston Peters, leader of one of Labour’s
crucial coalition partners. A link had emerged between a consulate appointment
(Peters was foreign affairs minister) and a large donation to NZ First by the
putative appointee. Controversy and denials raged but Peters was eventually
censured by the privileges committee. Labour did its best to distance itself
from the controversy.
It was never looking good for Labour
throughout the 2008 election campaign. It was a time-worn government, Helen
Clark was looking past her best and Labour was seen as an over-reactive
government, particularly in relation to the foreshore and seabed legislation
(2004) which was really unnecessary and later repealed; and the electoral
finance act of 2007 which proved to be cumbersome and caused numerous problems
in interpretation.
Facing John Key in three televised debates
Helen Clark was upstaged in all but the last one. The polls were showing
National ahead but taking into account potential coalition partners available to
Labour, the result remained unpredictable.
But more and more predictable as election
night rolled on. The progress results were consistently showing National’s party
vote around 45% and Labour’s around 34%. Even with support from Jim Anderton’s
Progressives, the Greens, United Future and (unlikely) the Maori party Labour’s
left of centre block reached only 59 seats – three short of the total required
to govern. National’s 58 seats also came up short, somewhat to their
disappointment but the unfailing support of the ACT party with its 5 seats
ensured an election win for a National/ACT minority government. Helen Clark’s
Labour party was out of office after nine years.
It was a fair result and clearly reflected the
wishes of the electorate. Conspicuously absent from the make-up of the house was
the NZ First party. For the first time since their inauguration in 1993 they
failed to either reach 5% (they scored 4.07%) or win any electorate seats. They
had polled only 4.26 in 1999 but Winston Peters won his seat thus bringing four
list MPs into parliament with him. Since 2002 they had won no electorate seats
but had managed to clear the 5% threshold. Their best performance was 13.35% in
1996. 2008 would be a temporary lapse – the party would return in 2011 and
beyond.
Almost as though she had planned it all along
if her party was beaten, Helen Clark’s election night speech included the words
“My time leading the Labour party is finished.” A chorus of “No!!” from the
party faithful greeted the words but Clark had made up her mind. Within months
she announced she was taking up a position as head of the United Nations
Development Programme - probably the most senior international administrative
position in the world ever attained by a woman. Still as ambitious as ever, in
2016 she made a bid for the top United Nations position: Secretary-General. At
one stage she was among the favourites and would have been the first woman to
hold the job. Ultimately she lost out to Antonio Guterres of Portugal.
In 2010 Helen Clark was awarded the Order of
New Zealand, the country’s highest honour limited to only twenty living persons.
Probably Helen Clark’s most outstanding
achievement was maintaining stable government for nine years while depending
throughout on support from parties varying widely on the political spectrum. In
this she showed a deeper understanding of the MMP system than did her two
predecessors. She remained firmly in control and yet was able to stand back and
allow her coalition partners to introduce two of the more enduring legacies of
her administration: KiwiBank and the superannuitants’ Gold Card.
In the opinion of David Bassett Helen Clark
was the Labour party’s most able leader since Peter Fraser. She was its longest
serving, only just eclipsing Harry Holland, and the only Labour leader to win
three elections. Always authoritative, she was respected rather than loved;
managerial rather than inspirational; incremental rather than earth-moving.
While stern and serious in parliament and in media interviews she showed a warm,
softer side when mingling with people.
She presided over an increasingly diverse
economy and supported free trade and the arts. She retained NZ’s nuclear-free
status, supported public health and worked hard to maintain New Zealand’s
independence internationally. In these and many other aspects she proved to be
more centrist than left-wing but the nanny state label stuck.
Labour did not leave the economy in good
shape. Its social spending and large public service rendered it vulnerable to
negative external influences and one such was building to a peak as Labour’s
term ended. Fallout from the Global Financial Crisis was totally beyond the
government’s control but had to be left to an incoming National government to
deal with. Labour would now spend nine years in the wilderness. But Helen
Clark’s supporters had remained loyal to the end. They knew she had drawn
together a divided party, distanced herself from “Rogernomics” while
surreptitiously retaining its benefits, managed diverse coalition partners and
restored solidarity. Her party needed a successor of equal stature. There wasn’t
one.
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